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The International Terrorism Tribunal: 
The Better Method of Adjudicating Terrorism Cases 
 
Terrorism, through political assassinations, mass killings of civilians, or bombings, has 
been a persistent problem throughout history. The tragic events on September 11, 2001 have 
elevated terrorism to not just a national, but a global security threat. Non-state terrorist 
organizations, such as Al Qaeda, have managed to establish branches in several countries across 
the world. Thus, a single organization is now capable of perpetrating attacks around the world. 
While the goal of any government would be to punish the individuals responsible for acts of 
terror, it is important that in this process of retribution, states do not punish the innocent who 
may simply have been in the wrong place at the wrong time. Furthermore, even those individuals 
who have in fact committed grave acts of terrorism are nonetheless entitled to the same due 
process rights as the innocent in a fair and impartial justice system.  
Domestic courts have traditionally adjudicated international terrorism cases. However, 
with human rights organizations expressing concern over non-national detainee rights violations 
in both the U.S. and abroad, and seeing the struggles that domestic courts have faced in 
providing individuals with their proper due process rights, it is time for the international 
community to play a larger role in adjudicating terrorism cases. An international terrorism 
tribunal will provide suspected terrorists with greater justice, guarantee that their human rights 
are preserved and protected, and the process will have greater legitimacy and acceptance. 
There are a number of options on how to establish an international tribunal. Tribunals can 
be treaty based, ad hoc, which are established by the Security Council, or can be hybrid tribunals, 
in which the United Nations works closely with particular state after or during a conflict. To 
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have a long-term court with the greatest legitimacy, acceptance and effectiveness, a treaty based 
international tribunal to adjudicate terrorism would be the best option in the interest of fairness 
and due process for suspected terrorists.  
This paper will first examine the problems with the existing judicial structure for 
adjudicating terrorism in the domestic setting, particularly focusing on how the United States and 
the United Kingdom have tried non-national suspected terrorists. Part II explains the current 
types of international tribunals in existence, and their limitations in prosecuting international 
terrorism. Part III proposes the jurisdiction, structure, and function of an international terrorism 
tribunal. This paper concludes that a new international terrorism tribunal should be established as 
a permanent court in which states can bring non-national terrorists to be tried. This court would 
borrow aspects of the International Criminal Court, international ad hoc criminal tribunals, and 
hybrid tribunals.  
I. Problems with Domestic Systems 
A. The United States  
After the United States invaded Afghanistan, the Bush administration grappled with the 
issue of what to do with the individuals captured during the fighting. President Bush ordered the 
individuals to be sent to a detention center in Guantanamo Bay.
1
  The first detainees began 
arriving in Guantanamo on January 11, 2002, with some of the men already having been held for 
months in Afghanistan.
2
 Reports of detainee abuse and torture are widespread.
3
 
                                                 
1
 Military Order: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 13  
November 2001 available at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/eo/mo-111301.htm.  
2
 Amnesty Int’l, Guantanamo: A Decade of Damage to Human Rights, AI Index AMR 51/103/2011 (Dec.16, 2011) 
available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/sites/default/files/guantanamo_10_report.pdf. 
3
 Id. 
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The US quickly looked to establishing military tribunals to try the combatants detained in 
the US’s War on Terror.4 Shortly after the US invaded Afghanistan, President Bush issued an 
executive order which stated that individuals captured during the fighting would be tried under 
military tribunals.
5
 These tribunals have been at the center of great legal tug-of-war, with the 
judiciary striking down the military commissions for their unconstitutionality, and then Congress 
passing legislation to legalize them.
6
   
The Military Commissions set up to try the detainees captured in Afghanistan have been 
criticized for serious human rights violations, including due process rights, equality before the 
law, and right to be free from arbitrary detention.
7
 The United States’ current method of trying 
the detainees in the military commissions violates international law.
8
 Even under the reformed 
Military Commissions, several provisions of the International Convention on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) including the rights to due process as guaranteed in Articles 9 and 14 have been 
violated.
9
 The articles state that “no one shall be subject to arbitrary arrest and detention.”10 
President Bush justified certain individuals’ detention as labeling them enemy combatants under 
the laws of war.
11
 However, more than a decade has passed since the first inmates arrived at 
Guantanamo Bay from Afghanistan, and several of these men have not yet been tried.
12
 In fact, 
                                                 
4
 Military Order: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 13  
November 2001. 
5
 Id.  
6
 See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).  
7
 Amnesty Int’l, Guantanamo: A Decade of Damage to Human Rights, AI Index AMR 51/103/2011 (Dec.16, 2011) 
available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/sites/default/files/guantanamo_10_report.pdf. 
8
 Id. 
9
 Id. 
10
 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
11
 Beth Van Schaack & Ronald C. Slye, International Criminal Law and its Enforcement (foundation press, 2
nd
 ed.  
2010). 
12
 Guantanamo: 10 years of human wrongs, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, Nov. 1, 2012, 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/guant-namo-10-years-human-wrongs-2012-11-01. 
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48 of the men have not even had formal charges brought against them.
13
 The U.S. is thus denying 
the detainees held in Guantanamo Bay with the most fundamental rights that should be afforded 
to them under international law. It is far too long for the detainees to still be considered enemy 
combatants. As the US wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are coming to a close, the terror suspects 
detention can no longer be considered legal.  
Furthermore, groups such as Amnesty International have criticized the US’s disregard of 
international guarantees like equality before the law.
14
 For example, in the case of those captured 
in Afghanistan, US nationals would receive a full and fair trial in the ordinary federal criminal 
justice system, while non-nationals could be deprived of those privileges due to their national 
origin alone since military commissions only apply to foreign nationals.
15
 
A U.S. Army Colonel himself noted that there are “certain gaps that are not present in 
other more developed systems” in the military tribunals for detainees.16 One example of a 
detainee’s rights being violated is Khalid Sheikh Mohammed’s case. After being captured, he 
was not brought to a federal court where he had been indicted, but instead put into secret CIA 
custody for three and a half years and was subjected to torture and other cruel and degrading 
treatment including waterboarding.
17
 
After the Supreme Court decided Hamdan v. Rumsfeld in 2006, which ruled that the 
Military Commissions were unconstitutional because they were not authorized by a 
                                                 
13
 Guantanamo Review Task Force, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE et. al. Jan. 22, 2010 
14
 Amnesty Int’l, Guantanamo: A Decade of Damage to Human Rights, AI Index AMR 51/103/2011 (Dec.16, 2011) 
available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/sites/default/files/guantanamo_10_report.pdf. 
15
 Id.  
16
 Id. 
17
 Guantanamo: 10 years of human wrongs, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, Nov. 1, 2012, 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/guant-namo-10-years-human-wrongs-2012-11-01.  
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congressional act, Uniform Code of Military Justice, or the Geneva conventions,
18
 the Bush 
administration moved Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and 13 other CIA detainees to Guantanamo 
Bay.
19
  
On November 13, 2009, Attorney General, Eric Holder, announced that five detainees 
including Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, would be transferred from Guantanamo to be tried in a 
federal criminal court.
20
 However, this announcement proved to be incredibly controversial as it 
created tremendous political debate.
21
 The Obama administration failed to take immediate action 
to transfer the detainees to the U.S. which only prolonged the political contentions.
22
 On April 
14, 2010, in a Senate Judiciary Committee, Attorney General Holder said the administration was 
reviewing where to try the detainees and would come to a decision in a matter of weeks. A year 
later, on April 4, 2011, the administration ultimately decided that the detainees would be tried 
through military commission.
23
 Thus, the Attorney General’s announcement only demonstrated 
the unwillingness of the Obama administration to conduct proceedings in federal courts, and 
proved the notion that trial in a federal court was not politically feasible. While federal courts 
would be a far better alternative than military commissions in adjudicating terrorism cases, in the 
U.S., currently, there simply is not the political will to do so.  
Furthermore, the U.S. strongly argues that aliens should be tried in military commissions 
so that civilian judges are removed from “military influence or persuasion.”24 In addition, the 
                                                 
18
 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 568 (2006). 
19
 Amnesty Int’l, Guantanamo: A Decade of Damage to Human Rights, AI Index AMR 51/103/2011 (Dec.16, 2011) 
available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/sites/default/files/guantanamo_10_report.pdf. 
20
 Id. 
21
 Id. 
22
 Id. 
23
 Id.  
24
 Hamdan at 586.  
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state argues the commissions protect the public interest as well as facilitate speedy trials.
25
 The 
U.S. certainly has not provided the detainees with speedier trials through the military 
commissions systems. However, the detainees may have concerns that an American system will 
not treat them as fairly or be as sympathetic to them as American citizens suspected of terrorism.  
While turning to an international court to try terrorists is not something the Obama 
administration had embraced or even acknowledged, it is certainly an option it should strongly 
consider as it will ameliorate many of the problems the US is facing in its domestic system. It 
will strengthen America’s commitment to human rights and show the work that the US respects 
and embraces international institutions.  
B. The United Kingdom  
The United States is not the only country that has faced difficulties in trying suspected 
terrorists. Since 9/11 the United Kingdom took a number of steps in attempting to counter 
terrorism. The UK did not establish special military tribunals to try suspected terrorist but instead 
tried those individuals in civilian criminal courts.
26
 However, in the process, the British 
government also adopted certain laws which, critics argue, severely undermine civil liberties.
27
 
In 1997, the UK established the Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC), 
whose main role was to hear appeals against the Home Secretary’s decision to deport non-
citizens on national security grounds.
28
 The events of 9/11 brought more suspected terrorists to 
such deportation proceedings.
29
 To this day, SIAC generates great controversy. One of the 
                                                 
25
 Id. at 559. 
26
 Simon Crowther, The SIAC, Deportation, and European Law, 6 CAMBRIDGE STUDENT L. REV. 227, 228 (2010). 
27
 Id.  
28
 Id.  
29
 Id.  
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biggest issues of contention is the nature of the proceedings.
30
 After an open session with the 
appellant, the court goes into a closed session in which neither the appellant nor his lawyers are 
present.
31
 The rationale for this is that the material discussed by the court is too sensitive to be 
entered into the public domain for national security reasons.
32
 Furthermore, the court requires a 
very low burden of proof, just reasonable suspicion, to prove that an individual as a threat to 
national security.
33
 Human rights groups have criticized the low burden of proof stating that it 
vastly increases the scope of injustices to occur, in that the state can target innocent individuals 
in the course of their investigation.
34
  
A second major flaw with SIAC is that the proceedings are generally conducted with the 
intent to deport the appellants to countries that are deemed unsafe by the EU.
35
 There is often the 
risk that individuals will be mistreated when they are returned to certain countries.
36
 While the 
UK argues that it sends the appellants to countries with diplomatic assurances that the deportee 
will not be mistreated, it is difficult to know how the detainee is in fact treated unless human 
rights groups such as Amnesty International or Human Rights Watch stay in contact with the 
detainee.
37
 The U.S. has a similar problem of what to do with individuals who have been found 
to be non threatening but their home countries will likely subject them to human rights 
violations.
38
 
                                                 
30
 Id.  
31
 Simon Crowther, The SIAC, Deportation, and European Law, 6 CAMBRIDGE STUDENT L. REV. 227, 228 (2010). 
32
 Id. at 228 
33
 Id. at 228-29.  
34
 Id. at 229 
35
  Simon Crowther, The SIAC, Deportation, and European Law, 6 CAMBRIDGE STUDENT L. REV. 227, 227 (2010).  
36
 Id .  
37
 Id. at 235 
38
 Profiles of Guantanamo Detainees in Need of Safe Haven, CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, 
HTTP://CCRJUSTICE.ORG/LEARN-MORE/REPORTS/PROFILES-GUANTANAMO-DETAINEES-NEED-SAFE-HAVEN (LAST 
accessed Dec. 1, 2012). 
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Another example of the UK’s flawed system in dealing with terrorists is a technique it 
uses, called the control order system, to prevent terrorism.
39
 Here, when the UK suspects 
individuals of terrorism, it significantly curtails their civil liberties by monitoring the suspects’ 
actions and invading their freedoms of privacy and movement.
40
 Targeted suspects are subject to 
involuntary relocation to a different town or city in the UK to break up support networks.
41
 They 
must abide by curfews of up to 16 hours, and are further subjected to confinement in a territory, 
financial reporting, and restrictions on association and communication.
42
 All of these restrictions 
on civil liberties are performed on individuals who have only been suspected of, and not 
convicted of terrorism.
43
 Like SIAC, when the state reviews these charges, it is done through a 
closed material process in which the accused cannot hear the evidence and therefore cannot rebut 
it.
44
 Currently, the control order regime has ended, and the suspects forced to relocate have been 
able to return home. The replacement system, T-Pims, involves even greater surveillance of the 
new suspects.
45
  
Ultimately, the current systems of adjudication terrorism claims of foreign nationals is 
not sufficient as can be seen in the U.S. and U.K. In the U.S., there is deep political opposition to 
trying terrorists in federal courts. The current military commissions system violates due process 
and international laws. There are far too many men detained still without charges. In the U.K., 
there is again the problem of suspected terrorists not having their due process rights adequately 
                                                 
39
 Dominic Casciani, Terrorism control order system ends at midnight, BBC (Jan 24, 2012, 7:37 PM) 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-16702656 
40
 Id. 
41
 Owen Bowcott, UK terror suspects sent into internal exile under control orders, GUARDIAN (Mar. 26, 2012, 6:06 
AM) http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2012/mar/26/terror-suspects-exile-control-orders/print. 
42
Id.  
43
 Id.  
44
 Id.  
45
 Dominic Casciani, Terrorism control order system ends at midnight, BBC (Jan 24, 2012, 7:37 PM) 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-16702656 
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provided. The surest way to guarantee that individuals will have their due process rights 
preserved is to have an international tribunal that can create the proper safeguards and will have 
the approval and oversight of the international community to make sure that the trials are being 
conducted in a fair and proper manner.  
II. Current International Criminal Tribunals 
While there are several international courts already in existence, none are appropriate to 
tackle terrorism cases in their current state. However, much can be learned from the established 
institutions and lessons can be incorporated into creating a new terrorism tribunal. 
A. Permanent Courts 
The most advanced and enduring international court is the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ). However, the Court only has jurisdiction over disputes between states.
46
 The ICJ could not 
hear a terrorism case unless the act of terrorism was state sponsored. Thus, the ICJ could not hear 
any of the cases arising out of the actions of individuals who are allegedly members of Al-
Qaeda, for example, which is a non-state actor.  
The International Criminal Court (ICC) is a newer international court. Celebrating its 
tenth anniversary November 14, the ICC’s jurisdiction pertains to individuals.47 Persons acting in 
their individual, state, or organizational capacity can come before the court.
48
 Therefore, a 
suspected terrorist could potentially come before the ICC. However, the ICC’s jurisdiction is 
                                                 
46
 States Entitled to Appear Before the Court, INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, http://www.icj-
cij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?p1=5&p2=1&p3=1&sp3=a, (last visited Nov. 10, 2012).  
47
 News and Highlights, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC (last accessed Nov. 
10, 2012).  
48
 Jurisdiction and Admissibility, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, http://www.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ICC/About+the+Court/ICC+at+a+glance/Jurisdiction+and+Admissibility.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 
2012).  
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limited to the gravest of human rights abuses, which under the current statute do not cover 
terrorism.
49
 In order for the ICC to be able to adjudicate terrorism, the Rome Statute, the treaty 
establishing the ICC, must be amended.
50
 Such an amendment will only be binding on those 
states which accept it.
51
 Also, there are other limits on its jurisdiction. The crimes covered under 
the Rome Statute are genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of 
aggression, and there are also temporal and territorial limitations.
 52
 
Interestingly, the initial draft of the Rome Statute did contain a provision including 
crimes of terrorism within the Court’s jurisdiction.53 Early drafts in 1998 had states submitting 
several definitions for terrorism. Generally, the term was defined broadly but had the elements of 
(1) violence against (2) civilian persons (3) to create terror (4) for a political purpose. One such 
example in the second proposal to the Rome statute defined terrorism as “in all its forms and 
manifestations involving the use of indiscriminate violence, committed against innocent persons 
or property intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror, fear and insecurity in the minds of 
the general public or populations resulting in death or serious bodily injury, or injury to mental 
or physical health and serious damage to property irrespective of any considerations and 
purposes of a political, ideological, philosophical, racial, ethnic, religious or of such other nature 
that may be invoked to justify it, is a crime.”54  
The United States, however, was deeply concerned with the inclusion of terrorism as part 
of the ICC’s mandate. From as early as 1995, the U.S. adamantly argued against including 
                                                 
49
 United Nations: Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 37 I.L.M 999(5), (1998). 
50
 United Nations: Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 37 I.L.M 999(5), (1998). 
51
 Richard J. Goldstone & Janine Simpson, Evaluating the Role if the International Criminal Court as a Legal 
Response to Terrorism, 16 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 13, 24 (Spring, 2003). 
52
 United Nations: Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 37 I.L.M 999(5), (1998). 
53
 Johan D. van der Vyver, Prosecuting Terrorism in International Tribunals, 24 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 527, 538 
(2010).   
54
 Id. 
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terrorism, and drug trafficking in the court’s jurisdiction.55 It stated that as a country that is a 
frequent target of international terrorists and drug traffickers, it was concerned that the ICC 
could “compromise important, complex, and costly investigations carried out by its criminal, 
justice or military authorities.”56 The US feared that the ICC might undermine US investigation 
or prosecution of crimes.
57
 It was also concerned that the ICC might not be able to competently 
investigate crimes, or create precise definitions for them.
58
 The US was hesitant to share highly 
sensitive national security information with other states, as being a party to the ICC would 
require. 
59
 Thus, terrorism was ultimately excluded from the Rome Statute, and the ICC does not 
have jurisdiction to hear terrorism cases.  
As can be seen by the ICJ, ICC, and the UN itself, treaties are the most common method 
of establishing large international organizations.
60
 One hundred twenty one states are parties to 
the Rome Statue of the ICC.
61
 Such a large number of state parties gives the ICC international 
legitimacy. However, such a treaty is only binding on those states which are a party. States, such 
as the US, who are not party to the Rome Statute are also not bound to its jurisdiction.  
While it is possible to expand the ICC’s jurisdiction through an amendment, there are two 
major problems to this. Firstly, many states such as the United States would not have jurisdiction 
because they are not party to the Court. The problem of the Guantanamo detainees, military 
commissions, and prolonged arbitrary detention in the US would still be at large. Secondly, the 
                                                 
55
 Id. 
56
 Id.  
57
 Id.  
58
Id.   
59
 Johan D. van der Vyver, Prosecuting Terrorism in International Tribunals, 24 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 527, 535-37 
(2010).  
60
 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, in Report of the International Law 
Commission, U.N. GAOR, 53rd Sess., Supp. No. 10, art. 4, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001), 
61
 The State Parties to the Rome Statute, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, http://www.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ASP/states+parties/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2012).  
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ICC only tries individuals responsible of the gravest offenses. Several lower level terror suspects 
would not have their cases heard at the ICC. If they did, it would place an incredibly large 
burden on the Court as it would be inundated with hundreds of cases of suspected terrorism.  
A case may come to the ICC in one of three ways. One, the Security Council may refer a 
case to the ICC. Two, a state party to the Rome Statute may refer a case. Third, the ICC 
prosecutor may initiate and investigate a case to bring to the Court.
62
 Furthermore, the ICC 
espouses the notion of complementarity, meaning that while the ICC has jurisdiction over certain 
issues, domestic courts have jurisdiction over those same issues as well.
63
 Once the domestic 
courts have exhausted their remedies, the case can be brought to the ICC as a court of last resort. 
Also, the Court has specialized evidentiary and procedural rules to fit the crimes within the 
court’s jurisdiction.64 A single set of procedural and substantive laws are applied to all parties. 
This unity ensures greater consistency and legal certainty in the ICC’s decisions.65  
Thus, while the ICC is an excellent forum for adjudicating criminals for violating 
international law and can lend much to an international terrorism tribunal through its 
jurisdictional and procedural rules, it is not sufficient for adjudicating international terrorism. To 
include terrorism in the court’s jurisdiction, states would have to amend the Rome Statute, and 
still, only states party to the ICC, not including the US, could bring terrorism claims to the court. 
Even then, only the most egregious perpetrators of terrorism would be brought to the court, 
which would not solve the vast problem of the injustice for the non-nationals suspected of 
terrorism in domestic courts discussed above.   
                                                 
62
 Richard J. Goldstone & Janine Simpson, Evaluating the Role if the International Criminal Court as a Legal 
Response to Terrorism, 16 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 13, 22 (Spring, 2003). 
63
 United Nations: Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 37 I.L.M 999(5), (1998). 
64
 Richard J. Goldstone & Janine Simpson, Evaluating the Role if the International Criminal Court as a Legal 
Response to Terrorism, 16 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 13, 22 (Spring, 2003). 
65
 Id. 
Khokhar 13 
 
B. Ad Hoc Courts 
An ad hoc tribunal is a second type of international court, such as the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) or the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (ICTR), established under a UN Security Council resolution.
66
 The ICTY and ICTR 
were international ad hoc tribunals established by the Security Council in, during, or after 
conflicts under their Chapter VII powers.
67
 Chapter VII of the UN Charter allows the Security 
Council to take measures to ensure international peace and security.
68
 While the Council has 
generally used Chapter VII powers during a time of armed conflict, the language of the mandate 
is broad and maintaining international peace and security might include establishing a tribunal to 
maintain peace even when there is not an outright conflict.  
After the war in the former Yugoslavia the United Nations decided to play a larger role in 
the region’s reconstruction.69 On February 22, 1993, the UN Security Council set up an 
international tribunal to prosecute those responsible for violating international law in the area 
since 1991.
70
 In May of 1993, the UN Secretary General submitted a report including proposals 
for the effective administration of the Security Council’s decision to establish an international 
tribunal.
71
 By the end of that month, the Security Council, established the ICTY.
72
 While 
Security Council resolutions are generally binding on all states, in the resolution establishing the 
                                                 
66
 Draft Articles on Responsibility of International Organizations, 61st sess, May 4-June 5, July 6-Aug. 7, U.N. Doc. 
A/64/10; U.N. GAOR 64th Sess., Supp. No. 10, art. 10, (2009) 
67
 BETH VAN SCHAACK & RONALD C. SLYE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ENFORCEMENT 41 (2d ed. 
2010).  
68
 UN Charter ch. 7 art 39 
69
 FABIAN O. RAIMONDO, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW IN THE DECISIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 84 (2008). 
70
 Id.  
71
 Id. 
72
 Id.  
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ICTY, the Council specifically reaffirmed that all states must fully cooperate with the ICTY.
73
 
Part of the ICTY’s mandate specified that while the ICTY and domestic courts would have 
concurrent jurisdiction, the ICTY would have primacy over cases.
74
  
Similarly, the Security Council established the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (ICTR) in 1994.
75
 Its statute was similar to the ICTY’s in that it had jurisdiction only 
over natural persons and had jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity, and violations 
of the Geneva Conventions.
76
  
Neither the ICTY nor the ICTR are located in the states in which the atrocities occurred.
77
 
The ICTY is located in The Hague, and the ICTR is in Tanzania.
78
 While moving the location 
may make it more difficult to relocate evidence and witnesses, changing the location 
demonstrates the courts’ independence. The courts, nonetheless, are kept close enough to the 
target countries so that the populations can feel and sense justice as part of the healing process.
79
  
While the courts are in effect, they have jurisdiction over individuals ranging from the 
highest ranking military, political and civilian officials to even lower ranking defendants.
 80
  In 
the winding down process for these courts, the lower ranked defendants can be tried by domestic 
                                                 
73
 Id.  
74
 Mandate and Jurisdiction, UN ICTY, http://www.icty.org/sid/320 (Last visited Dec. 1, 2012).   
75
 FABIAN O. RAIMONDO, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW IN THE DECISIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 143 (2008) 
76
 Id.  
77
 Michael Humphrey, International intervention, justice and national reconciliation: the role of the ICTY and ICTR 
in Bosnia and Rwanda 2 J. HUM. RTS. 495, 495 (2003).   
78
 Id. 
79
 Sandra L. Hodgkinson, Are Ad Hoc Tribunals an Effective Tool for Prosecuting International Terrorism Cases?, 
24 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 515, 519 (2010). 
80
BETH VAN SCHAACK & RONALD C. SLYE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ENFORCEMENT 41 (2d ed. 
2010). 
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courts.
81
 Like the ICC, a benefit of such specialized ad hoc tribunals is that the courts are able to 
make specialized procedural rules specific to the situation that the UN is facing.
82
  
While ad hoc tribunals are becoming increasingly popular, they have limitations in 
adjudicating terrorists. Because they are mandated by the Security Council, the time required to 
establish the courts would be far shorter than if it were established by treaty.  Furthermore, 
because the SC decision would be binding on all states, there would not be an issue of other 
states accepting the court’s jurisdiction.83 In these ways, ad hoc tribunals seem like an attractive 
option to adjudicate terrorism. However, not all states may be as willing to comply with such a 
mandate. The ICTY and ICTR are courts established with limited jurisdiction.
84
 They deal with 
specific crimes in a limited area, over a specific time. Terrorism, while a specific crime, can 
occur anywhere in the world and is a continuing problem. States might not be willing to give up 
their own procedure for prosecuting suspected terrorists and handing the individuals over to an 
international tribunal. While it may indeed be a better way to treat suspects, the states should 
decide this for themselves by becoming party to a treaty, not have the Security Council mandate 
this on them.  
Terrorism is an international crime. Just one organization, Al Qaeda has perpetrated acts 
of terrorism in a number of countries including the US, UK, Nigeria, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. 
If an ad hoc tribunal were to be established, where would it be located? Historically, ad hoc 
tribunals have been kept close to the regions where the victims are located so that they have a 
sense of justice. But in the case of terrorism, attacks are so widespread that having a single 
                                                 
81
 Id.  
82
 Sandra L. Hodgkinson, Are Ad Hoc Tribunals an Effective Tool for Prosecuting International Terrorism Cases?, 
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tribunal located close to all the victims is simply impossible. Having a neutral location, like the 
ICC in The Hague, for example, would be a better option for an international terrorism court.   
Thus, while ad hoc tribunals have been successful and efficient in adjudicating 
international crimes, they are too particularized and limited in territorial and temporal 
jurisdiction to be able to adjudicate international terrorism effectively.  
C. Hybrid Courts  
A third type of international tribunal is also the most recent type of tribunal.
85
 Hybrid 
tribunals, also known as second generation ad hoc tribunals, have been established through 
Security Council mandates in post-conflict situations such as in Kosovo and East Timor.
86
 In 
Kosovo’s case in particular, the hybrid court was established under a Security Council resolution 
to establish the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) to maintain 
peace and security in the territory in the region.
87
 The Secretary General was placed in charge of 
overseeing the mission.
88
 This included performing civilian administrative functions such as 
maintaining law and order.
89
  
In a hybrid court, international judges work closely with local judges to establish a 
system of law and order in the country. The courts are located in the country, and are not 
relocated to a different county.
90
 Because the courts are generally established in post conflict 
countries, they are meant to be transitions, where the UN can come in to help the country rebuild 
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its justice system.
91
 The aim is that the country will transition successfully, and the UN will no 
longer have to be a presence. While the judges are a blend of national and international, the 
lawyers are domestic and the law is reformed to reflect international law.
92
 
In fact, in 2007, the United Nations did establish an international court for the 
adjudication of terrorism. This court, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, however, had extremely 
limited jurisdiction. On February 14, 2005, Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri was 
assassinated in a terrorist bombing.
93
 The Lebanese government requested the UN to establish a 
tribunal of international character to prosecute the perpetrators of this specific crime, and in May, 
2007, the UN Security Council passed resolution 1757 establishing the court.
94
 However, this 
court only applies the domestic Lebanese Criminal Code as substantive law.
95
 The court does not 
have jurisdiction over international crimes.
96
 Furthermore, the court only has jurisdiction over 
crimes solely relating to the attacks on February 14, 2005.
97
 Thus, while the Special Tribunal for 
Lebanon was indeed a court dealing specifically with terrorism, it is far too limited in its 
jurisdiction to be an influence in the creation of a permanent tribunal adjudicating international 
terrorism.  
Another downside to ad hoc tribunals is that they are very expensive undertakings.
98
 
Funds for an ad hoc tribunal can be raised through voluntary contributions or assessed UN 
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contributions.
99
 Collecting funds through voluntary contributions can be very time intensive.
100
 
The Special Court for Sierra Leone, for example, spent a third of its time lobbying governments 
for funds, instead of prosecuting criminals.
101
 Then, because such courts are temporary, funds 
must be raised anew once another ad hoc tribunal is established.
102
 
Finally, hybrid tribunals would be the least attractive option to adjudicate terrorism 
claims for a long term basis. Where the UN works with a particular country to build up the 
judiciary in a hybrid system, here because terrorism is global, it would not be appropriate to 
establish a court in just one country.  
However, a hybrid tribunal would most likely be the best short term solution for the 
suspected terrorists already in detention in Guantanamo Bay. A hybrid tribunal could quickly be 
established under Security Council mandate. Those currently held in Guantanamo would be 
transferred under international control and their trials would be conducted on neutral, non-
American soil.
103
 Both American and international judges would be appointed to hear the case.
104
 
It would be funded by American and international donors. Such a system would help the US in 
particular provide detainees with guarantees of independence and impartiality.
105
 The biggest 
obstacle to this approach is the US’s consent to allow a hybrid tribunal to be set up. A 
tremendous lobbying effort would have to take place in Washington to show US leaders that 
embracing and not excluding international laws and international solutions would be the best 
approach to the current problems related to terrorism. America’s reputation would be enhanced 
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in the world by demonstrating its commitment to justice and international law, and it would have 
less of a cost in dealing with terrorism crimes.  
In conclusion, much can be learned and adopted from the current international tribunals 
that have been established through the United Nations. From the ICC, an international terrorism 
tribunal can adopt the notion that permanent courts are best established through treaty. It can 
borrow and adapt the ICC’s established rules of procedure, evidence and the nuances of 
adjudication. However, from the ad hoc tribunals, the court can adopt the notion that the 
international court will have primacy over claims. Finally, from the hybrid tribunals, the court 
can adopt the practice of adjudicating even lower level crimes.  
III. Establishing an International Terrorism Tribunal 
A. International law and terrorism historically  
The notion of trying terrorism as an international crime is not novel. Long before the 
tragic events of 9/11, international terrorism was a grave problem that the international 
community felt needed to be addressed. In 1934, King Alexander of Yugoslavia and Louis 
Barthou were both assassinated.
106
 That year, the League of Nations took up the issue of defining 
international law regarding terrorism and a committee of experts drafted the Convention on the 
Punishment and Prevention of Terrorism, and the Convention for the Creation of an International 
Criminal Court.
107
 A League of Nations conference adopted the two conventions on November 
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16, 1937.
108
 However, India was the only state to actually ratify the Convention on the 
Punishment and Prevention of Terrorism.
109
  
The United States again raised the issue of international terrorism in 1972 by submitting a 
draft convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Certain Acts of International 
Terrorism.
110
 However, the project fared very badly in the UN’s Legal Committee, where 
problems of the underlying causes of terrorism bogged down any furtherance on the treaty.
111
  
The attacks on 9/11, shook the international community and spurred action. Even the 
more isolationist Bush administration could see that multilateral cooperation would be necessary 
to combat the increasingly global problem of terrorism. The US sponsored resolutions in both the 
Security Council and the General Assembly on September 12, 2001 which stressed the need for 
“all states to work together” and show international cooperation to eradicate terrorism.112 
However, this was a brief resolution aimed at condemning terrorism, and did not include a 
specific definition of the crime.
113
  
Thus, states agree that terrorism is a grave problem but have not yet defined it, nor have 
they come together in a way to combat it. While preventing terrorism is a difficult, complicated, 
and controversial prospect, counter terrorism efforts, at this point best, are best dealt with by 
domestic authorities. However, deciding what to do with individuals after they have been 
suspected of terrorism is something on which states can come together and create a tribunal to 
adjudicate those individuals. Because current permanent international courts do not have the 
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jurisdiction to hear terrorism cases, establishing an international tribunal for the adjudication of 
terrorism would ameliorate many of the problems seen in domestic courts such as the neglect of 
international human rights law.  
B. Advantages of an international terrorism tribunal 
Adjudicating terrorism in an international forum is particularly advantageous for several 
reasons. Small states which lack the resources to adjudicate terrorism will find an international 
forum particularly helpful. Countries such as Egypt, Algeria, the Philippines, and Russia face 
frequent problems with terrorism but lack the ability to put them on trial.
114
 Similarly, states with 
unstable and weak governments will also benefit.
115
 These governments, such as Columbia, are 
often threatened with adverse political consequences or further violence.
116
 Because of this, the 
government at times finds itself resorting to illegal methods such as assassinations.
117
  
An international court will provide a neutral forum for states which would provide a more 
effective forum for prosecuting terrorists. It would prevent terrorist from seeking a safe haven in 
states which distrust the victim state’s judicial system, do not want to extradite for political 
reasons, or are unwilling to prosecute.
118
 An international court could mitigate the risk of states 
acting against international concerns by refusing to extradite or prosecute.
119
 For example, Libya 
initially refused to extradite the Pan Am Flight 103 bombing suspects.
120
 The benefits of an 
international court in that situation would be twofold.
121
 First, because Libya regarded the U.S. to 
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be an enemy, it would assume that the suspects would be found guilty.
122
 Thus, secondly, a 
sentence by an international tribunal would hurt Libya more because it was from a neutral 
international body, and not a political foe.
123
  
C. A future terrorism tribunal  
International courts can be established through treaty, or through the mandate of an 
existing international organization, like the United Nations. As seen in the examples of the 
International Criminal Court or the ICTY and ICTR, both are legitimate means of establishing a 
court and both methods have been used successfully in history. Establishing a court through 
treaty involves a greater number of state parties and involves greater consensus among states, but 
is very time consuming and key counties may not sign onto such a treaty. On the other hand, a 
tribunal mandated by the Security Council would be a more time efficient process, but only if all 
five permanent members of the Council, at least, vote to create such an institution.  
Here, establishing a permanent international terrorism tribunal would best be done 
through treaty. A treaty would most likely give the court legitimacy as states who are party to the 
treaty would be more involved in the court-making process and would be able to include 
reservations or make comments to clarify their positions in the court. Like the ICC, a treaty 
would give the terrorism tribunal a sense of permanent legitimacy, instead of having a smaller 
number of states imposing a court on all states. However, the major downside to a treaty based 
tribunal is that key states such as the US or the UK might not become parties to the treaties. 
Nonetheless, a treaty based approach to an international terrorism tribunal would be the best 
approach, as there would be more legitimacy, permanence, consensus among states, and states 
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like the US and UK could be persuaded through political, or reputational concerns to join such a 
treaty.  
In establishing an international terrorism tribunal through a treaty, the first step would be 
to define terrorism in a way in which all state parties can agree. There is some debate as to how 
to define this term as the common argument is that one man’s terrorist is another’s freedom 
fighter.
124
 There is a general understanding among states, however, that terrorism includes 1) 
violence 2) conducted against civilian targets 3) by subnational or clandestine perpetrators 4) 
with a political motivation.
125
 Thus, a definition that includes these requirements would be 
sufficient. 
 A second difficult issue states must agree upon is how to reconcile domestic laws against 
terrorism with international law. For example, the US had held suspected terrorists accountable 
for conspiracy and material support for terrorism.
126
 However, these are not crimes under 
international law.
127
 States can come to an accord on this issue. For example, they can agree to 
include material support for terrorism as a crime, however, would ensure that the punishment is 
proportional to the crime.  
In establishing an international terrorism tribunal, one of the major ways the tribunal 
would differ from the ICC is the type of persons the court would have jurisdiction over. Even if 
the Rome Statute is amended to include terrorism cases in its jurisdiction, the ICC only hears 
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cases involving the most egregious crimes.
128
 It looks to prosecute the leaders of such crimes.
129
 
The ICC would not hear, for example, Salim Hamdan’s case, who was not a high ranking officer, 
but was Osama Bin Ladin’s personal driver.130 Bringing his case to the ICC would not 
necessarily bring justice to the thousands of people who died through Al Qaeda’s actions. On the 
other hand, trying men like Hamdan is important to make sure that the innocent are not charged 
with grave crimes they did not commit, or, alternatively, that even low ranking perpetrators of 
terrorism are brought to justice. In this way, a new terrorism tribunal would be more like an ad 
hoc tribunal in that the scope of the prosecutions would be broader to include lower ranking 
individuals, such as Hamdan.  
For procedural matters in the terrorism tribunal, states can look to the ICC for guidance. 
The ICC has special rules of evidence, witness protection, testimony and rules of trial that have 
been specially tailored to fit the court’s jurisdiction.131 Similarly, an international terrorism 
tribunal would have specially tailored rules for terrorism. A terrorism court could even utilize 
many of the rules from the ICC, such as those regarding evidence and witness protection. As 
seen in the already established international courts, an international terrorism court would grant 
suspected terrorists with procedural safeguards. Rules of evidence and detainment would be 
established through treaty in a way all countries can agree. Furthermore, because the UN and 
international organizations would be involved, the court would comply with international law to 
the fullest extent. Therefore, rights such as due process, equality before the law and other rights 
guaranteed in the ICCPR would be preserved and protected. 
                                                 
128
 United Nations: Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 37 I.L.M 999(5), (1998). 
129
 Id. 
130
 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
131
 Richard J. Goldstone & Janine Simpson, Evaluating the Role of the International Criminal Court As A Legal 
Response to Terrorism, 16 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 13 (2003). 
 
Khokhar 25 
 
A major obstacle in establishing a tribunal for terrorism would be the cost. In fact, the 
high cost associated with establishing international tribunals is one of the biggest arguments for 
supporting domestic adjudication of terrorism.
132
 But here too, a treaty based system would be 
most effective. In that way, the treaty text could establish how and when each member party 
pays. Instead of having one country bear the brunt of the costs, or trying to find volunteer donors 
as in a hybrid system, parties to the treaty would pay to be part of the tribunal system and keep it 
running. In addition, the countries that refer the most cases might be the ones having to pay the 
highest dues. For example, if the US were to transfer all 166 of the detainees held in 
Guantanamo Bay today
133
 to an international tribunal to be tried, and the UK only sent 4 
individuals, the United States would have to pay for the vast majority of the cost to adjudicate 
the men.  
While this cost may seem unnecessarily high to the US since it already has an 
adjudicative system, the benefits of such an arrangement far outweigh the costs. The US would 
have a better reputation for complying with international law. It would be in better compliance 
with human rights demands. It could save costs otherwise by shutting down the military tribunals 
now in place. Thus, while there are definite monetary costs to an international tribunal, there are 
also cost saving benefits, and intangible benefits to a country.  
Like other international tribunals, domestic and international courts will have 
complementarity. However, the international terrorism tribunal will have primacy over domestic 
courts, just as the ad hoc and hybrid tribunals. This will ensure that the detainees’ human rights 
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and liberties are preserved and protected. Allowing domestic courts to continue trying the terror 
suspects would undermine the tribunal’s aim. While domestic courts would still have jurisdiction 
to try their own citizens, as is currently done in the U.S. and U.K. where citizens are tried under 
the ordinary criminal justice system, foreign nationals should be the individuals brought to the 
tribunal. Thus, for example, Shaker Aamer, a U.K. national who is a citizen of Saudi Arabia, but 
is held by the U.S. in Guantanamo Bay would be the type of person brought to the international 
terrorism court.
134
  
In crafting an international tribunal, not only states, but non-governmental organizations 
should also be able to include their input into the treaty making process. During the formation of 
the ICC, NGOs played a larger role than at any previous international conference.
135
 NGOs such 
as Amnesty International have not pushed for an international terrorism tribunal, and have 
instead focused on improving the current domestic situations for the detainees.
136
 However, this 
might be because they want to help the current detainees receive justice swiftly, instead of 
establishing an international tribunal which would take years. However, instead of establishing a 
tribunal solely for the purpose of adjudicating current terrorism cases, an international tribunal 
should be established to protect the rights of those suspected of terrorism in the future as well. 
Thus, even if states do decide to make an international tribunal, domestic institutions must 
maintain the effort to improve the human rights conditions of the current detainees.  
Thus, in establishing an international terrorism tribunal, much will be borrowed from 
existing international courts. The real hurdle is having states come together to form such a 
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tribunal. States, like the US, must realize that it is in their own interest to grant terror suspects 
neutral and fair trials so that suspects can be afforded their due rights and so that the states can 
have a reputation of being true advocates of international law.  
Conclusion 
Terrorism is a crime that, unfortunately, is likely to last for decades to come. A 
permanent court is needed to try those who have been suspected of terrorism. The current 
permanent international courts do not have jurisdiction to hear terrorism cases. A new permanent 
international terrorism tribunal should be established, keeping in mind the lessons that can be 
learned from both permanent and ad hoc international courts. Only then can states successfully 
bring suspected terrorists around the world to justice and at the same time preserve their human 
rights.  
 
 
